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Automotive Supplier Parks: An Imperative for Build-to-order? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Build-to-order (BTO) has been hailed as a production strategy that fits the demands of the 21
st
 
century where a considerable challenge for the industry is how to achieve flexibility from 
extended supply chains that span the globe and retain elements of make-to-forecast. A study of 8 
European manufacturers examines whether supplier parks are an imperative for BTO using a 
conceptual framework developed from the literature. The findings question the idea that simply 
locating suppliers in close proximity to OEM assembly plants reduces delivery lead time and 
inventory. Hence, not all types of supplier parks are an imperative for BTO, where the cases 
reveal a wide variety of types ranging in scale and proximity. The originality of the paper is a 
unique study which redefines both automotive supplier park terminology and the relationships 
with BTO. It questions received wisdom and offers practical measures for industry.  
 
 
Keywords: Supplier parks, build-to-order, proximity, flexibility. 
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Automotive Supplier Parks: An Imperative for Build-to-Order? 
 
1.  Introduction 
Build-to-order (BTO) has been hailed as a production strategy that fits the demands of the 21
st
 
century, fulfilling customer orders in short lead times through responsive manufacturing and 
information exchange (Gunasekaran, 2005; Holweg & Miemczyk, 2002; Holweg & Pil, 2004; 
Howard, Vidgen, & Powell, 2003). Yet a considerable challenge is how to achieve flexibility 
from extended supply chains that retain elements of the destructive cycle of make-to-forecast 
(Holweg & Pil, 2001). Today automotive supply chains hold weeks of component stocks, driven 
by a combination of vehicle manufacturer forecasts and supplier concerns over ‘stock-out’ arising 
from quality or delivery issues. Globalisation of the industry has meant that low value vehicle 
parts are now shipped from all corners of the world. For instance, to complete an engine assembly 
in the United Kingdom, the oil pump takes 8 weeks to arrive from South Korea, represents 26 
days worth of inventory, and travels over 8000 nautical miles. One way to achieve the increased 
level of flexibility demanded by BTO in recent years is through clusters of suppliers located in 
close proximity to production; we define this as a supplier park.  
Supplier parks are emerging as increasingly common in automotive and other industries, yet 
supplier parks and the implications for responsiveness are loosely defined in operations literature 
(Chew, 2003; Cullen, 2002). The case of Dell demonstrates the implications of BTO on the 
operations of a plant and the effect on suppliers. The Dell plant in Limerick, Ireland, is a factory 
driven purely by customer orders. With no Dell-owned warehouses serving the factory, the 
suppliers have to respond to requests within two hours. Hence all suppliers have local hubs and 
hold around two weeks stock to satisfy demand.  Orders are received every 15 minutes to a 
factory that holds only 4 hours stock and delivers an average fulfilment promise of between 5 to 7 
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days (Davis, 2005). As an example of customer responsiveness, Zara also stands out as an 
exemplary case, demonstrating in 2003 that it could design and deliver garments to its 600 stores 
in over 30 countries in only 15 days. This is made possible through a closely coupled design and 
order administration, and tightly controlled production network of 22 factories in Spain. 
Furthermore, 70% of Zara’s suppliers (out of 400) are based in Europe allowing a quick response 
to orders from the Zara factories (Ferdows, Lewis, & Machuca, 2003).      
Current descriptions of supplier parks in the automotive industry include ‘decentralised 
production in local assembly units … are located close to the car assembly plant’ (Millington, 
Millington, & Cowburn, 1998 p.180), and ‘a confined area in proximity to the assembly plant’ 
(Larsson, 2002 p.769). Given that supplier parks have been used for over a decade - for instance 
SEAT in Barcelona - it is surprising that the links with BTO have not been explored sooner. 
Hence, the aim of this research is to identify the role of supplier parks in BTO, and ask can they 
be considered an imperative for build-to-order? Eight cases of supplier parks are examined across 
Europe, where the phenomenon under investigation is build-to-order and the unit of analysis is 
the supplier park. The paper develops a conceptual framework derived from the literature with 
which to explain the data and provide a clearer understanding of the drivers, moderating factors, 
and outcomes. The current gap in knowledge over how supplier parks may facilitate BTO 
justifies the use of an exploratory multiple case study. In this context case studies are considered 
one of the most powerful methods in operations management particularly in the development of 
theory (Stuart, McCutcheon, Handfield, McLachlin, & Samson, 2002; Voss, Tsikriktsis, & 
Frohlich, 2002).   
 
2. Literature Review 
This section describes the objectives and requirements of build-to-order and the supporting role 
of supplier parks in the automotive industry. The literature review is structured by examining the 
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drivers and factors of supplier parks to support build-to-order (Figure 1). Several questions 
emerge from the literature, which underpin the conceptual framework used to structure the 
enquiry and focus our analysis. 
Take in Figure 1 
 
2.1 Build-to-order objectives 
Build-to-order requires different performance objectives from traditional mass production 
approaches such as make-to-stock. Hence, before devising a supply chain, Fisher (1997) 
recommends considering factors such as the predictability of demand for the product and the need 
for physical efficiency and market responsiveness. Fisher argues that it is the drive for efficiency 
in the process of supplying innovative high variety products in industries such as automobiles, 
personal computers, and other consumer goods that accounts for so many broken or unresponsive 
supply chains. In their seminal paper, Holweg and Pil (2001) use the ideas of Slack (1991) and 
Upton (1994) to develop core objectives for BTO: processes, product, and volume flexibility. 
Flexibility is defined by Slack (1991 p77) as the ‘…ability to change, to do something different’ 
whose framework includes aspects of flexibility not only across the total operation or system, but 
also the supply network. First, suppliers need to be integrated so that they can see orders based on 
real demand from customers, allowing process flexibility in the supply chain. Second, 
customisation needs to be brought closer to the customer instead of relying on finished goods, 
hence enabling product flexibility (Ward & Duray, 2000). The third objective - volume flexibility 
- requires negotiation with workers and suppliers to reduce the dependence on full capacity 
utilisation (Slack, 1991).  
One of the main requirements from a supply chain perspective is to closely tie supplier 
production schedules into customer production schedules (Holweg et al., 2001). Geographic 
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distance can be a major constraint to this level of integration between suppliers and customers for 
the following reason. The daily assembly schedule and vehicle assembly sequence is of little use 
where suppliers are located hundreds or thousands of miles away with commensurately long 
delivery lead times. Hence suppliers and customers hold stocks to cope with the issues of lead 
time and schedule variability. Strategies are needed to control the cost of flexibility for BTO 
where suppliers are continually under pressure from the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
to reduce the time needed to deal with variations between planned production and actual orders. 
One such strategy is the development of the supplier park.  
2.2 What are supplier parks? 
The co-location of supplier facilities has been described as relating to the choice of individual 
suppliers to set up a dedicated facility close to a customer (Millington et al., 1998). Previous 
authors have used terms such as ‘local assembly units’ or ‘local dedicated units’ which refer to 
geographically close individual supplier ties (Larsson, 2002; Millington et al., 1998). The broader 
concentration of production sites is commonly known as an ‘industry cluster’ and may be thought 
of as including supplier parks within that definition (Saxenian, 1994). We develop our own 
definition of supplier parks because to date they have been only described superficially, in the 
broadest sense of the term. Thus a supplier park is defined here as: 
‘A concentration of dedicated production, assembly, sequencing or warehousing facilities 
run by suppliers or a third party in close proximity - i.e., within 3 km - to the OEM plant.’ 
The number of automotive supplier parks have grown over the past decade especially in Europe 
and currently total 23 sites. Most OEMs have implemented some kind of supplier park including 
Ford, GM, Fiat, Peugeot, Renault, BMW and Volkswagen (Chew, 2003). The supplier parks used 
in this study are listed in Appendix A. Typical activities carried out in automotive supplier parks 
include warehouse and inventory management, sequencing, manual assembly and late 
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configuration, and range in size consisting of between 7 and 24 suppliers (Cullen, 2002; Kochan, 
2002). 
The motivating principles - or drivers - for developing supplier parks appear to vary across the 
descriptions of supplier parks. That supplier parks themselves vary widely (i.e., size, location, 
activity), suggests there is no simple relationship between drivers and characteristics of supplier 
parks. This paper draws from contingency theory to develop internal and external moderating 
factors (Kast & Rosenzweig, 1981) which may intervene before supplier parks enable BTO. 
Drivers and factors are discussed in the next section. 
2.3 Drivers towards supplier parks 
One of the key trends in the automotive sector is the increase in variant numbers of individual 
models of car (Holweg & Greenwood, 2001). This trend has led to an increase in the part 
numbers required by assembly plants and thus had an impact on the inventory policies of vehicle 
manufacturers (VMs) and the general need to maintain mix flexibility to remain competitive 
(Berry & Cooper, 1999). In this case assembly plants either hold a greater amount of inventory to 
ensure of supply of the correct parts or install more responsive supply chain processes such as 
sequenced in-line supply (SILS). Where SILS has been implemented the time between a car 
starting final assembly and the fit point of the particular part (such as a seat) is given to a supplier 
to deliver the part exactly as specified (Doran, 2001). Where this short order cycle time is only a 
matter of minutes, the supplier is often located close to the OEM plant (Larsson, 2002).  
Another trend related to increasing product variety in the automotive industry is the move 
towards simplifying production by introducing modules (Fredriksson, 2002; Hsuan, 1999; Sako 
& Murray, 1999). Arguments for modular supply include cost reduction through lower supplier 
wages and overheads, and inventory reduction, increased space and simpler transactions (Baldwin 
& Clark, 1997; Doran, 2003; Von Corswant & Fredriksson, 2002). Firms can mitigate the 
negative impact of product variety on operational performance by using modularity in the design 
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of product family architectures (Salvador, Forza, & Rungtusanatham, 2002). Taking modular 
supply to the extreme leads to the idea of ‘modular consortia’ where each module supplier locates 
next to the OEM plant, and has responsibility for all suppliers into the module, investing in the 
facility with the OEM and even assembling the module directly into the vehicle in some places 
(Collins, Bechler, & Pires, 1997). In theory, the practice of configuring complex product 
architecture through modular design with standard interfaces (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996), 
enables greater flexibility when considering supply chain strategies such as outsourcing (Hsuan, 
1999). Yet current practice shows that supplier parks are also represented by suppliers of 
commodity components (e.g. nuts and bolts), parts which are bulky, and high variety parts which 
can be late-configured just before delivery to the vehicle assembly line.          
Volume flexibility is seen as a further key to obtaining competitive advantage and there are a 
number methods by which manufacturing firms can achieve this (Jack & Raturi, 2002). The 
decision to co-locate a supplier facility near the OEM assembly plant can also be driven by a need 
for volume flexibility, for example where capacity is taken by an additional assembly line. The 
cost to hold this inventory may be shifted to the supplier instead of making use of an OEM 
controlled warehouse. 
A significant driver for setting up a co-located supplier facility is the opportunity for funding 
development of local production sites. Regional and local development agencies often have funds 
to establish production sites especially in areas identified as economically disadvantaged, for 
example where European structural funds are made available (Larsson, 2002). Regional 
development agencies may then approach large production facilities to offer them a subsidised 
infrastructure for further development of production facilities to encourage economic growth. 
 
2.4 Moderating factors affecting supplier parks 
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While the previous section describes drivers, this section identifies factors that moderate how 
supplier parks support the objectives of build-to-order. 
Start up costs  
The common objective for government funding for supplier parks tends to centre round assisting 
the vehicle manufacturer to remain competitive (Larsson, 2002). If the investment cost for 
increasing flexibility is high then assistance from local authorities is likely to be sought. 
However, the extent to which these agencies will fund the development may affect the ability to 
achieve the proposed objectives, and more specifically enable build-to-order. If the funding 
covers the development of all production facilities then the cost of initial start-up may be 
significantly lower than if only basic infrastructure such as road links are included. Therefore 
start-up costs have a significant impact on the overall cost of increasing flexibility. 
Choice of supplier and asset specificity  
The choice of supplier brought onto a supplier park will depend on the type of component or 
module being supplied. Co-location is likely where the part is specific to a particular vehicle, 
such as seats, cockpits, or external structures such as bumpers. This is especially the case where 
there are a number of variants of the part per model. Bulky parts such as front and rear-end 
modules that are costly to ship are also likely to be brought within close proximity to the final 
assembly line. Typically these product sub-systems (or modules) have been integrated into 
manufacturers’ operations, but the trend in recent years has been to outsource more of these major 
‘chunks’ of the product architecture, thus increasing distance between assembly operations (Sako 
& Warburton, 1999b). Such transactions can be thought of as having ‘high asset specificity’ - an 
attribute with a number of associated problems. 
Transaction cost economics argues that assets specific to a transaction are more likely to be 
internalised than non-transaction specific assets (Williamson, 1979). Thus if a supplier delivers 
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parts which are specific to one vehicle then the OEM is more likely to seek hierarchical control to 
reduce opportunism. Asset specificity is a key concept to understanding the benefit of specialized 
supplier networks according to Dyer (1996). For example, site specificity has been described as 
where ‘successive production stages are located in close proximity to one another to improve 
coordination and economize on inventory and transportation costs’ (Dyer, 1996 p.273).  
A particular problem that can occur is opportunistic re-contracting, where either the buyer or 
supplier can act opportunistically when contracts are renewed (by increasing prices or decreasing 
service levels, for example). Klein et al. (1986) describe the dealings that culminated in a vertical 
merger in the 1920s between General Motors (GM) and Fisher Body, a leading supplier of the 
new style of closed auto bodies. An exclusive dealing arrangement significantly reduced the 
possibility of GM acting opportunistically by demanding a lower price for the bodies after Fischer 
made the specific investment in production capacity. Unfortunately, these pricing provisions did 
not work out in practice. The shift in demand from open towards closed-style bodies meant GM 
was unhappy with the price it was being charged by its now very important supplier. In addition, 
Fisher refuse to locate their body plants adjacent to GM’s assembly plants, a move GM claimed 
was necessary for production efficiency, but which required a large and very specific investment 
on the part of Fisher. Finding the contractual relationship intolerable, GM began negotiations for 
purchasing the stock of Fisher Body, culminating in a final merger agreement in 1926.      
The degree to which post-contractual opportunistic behaviour occurs is dependent on how 
specific the assets are to the transaction, and therefore how difficult it is to write contracts 
accounting for all contingencies. If supplier facilities at supplier parks have highly specific assets 
(i.e. physical, human, and site-related) then the risks of opportunistic re-contracting is higher 
(Millington et al., 1998). Specific assets can also lead to strategic inflexibility as the OEM is 
dependent on the co-located supplier. In terms of supplier parks this issue was summarised by one 
automotive supplier as ‘while the set-up fosters a long-term partnership, it reduces flexibility in 
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quality or cost disputes’ (Cullen, 2002). Both these issues lead to a lack of supply chain 
flexibility, arguably an undesirable attribute for build to order. 
 
Institutional norms 
Outsourcing capacity also influences the development of a supplier park. Capacity at the OEM 
plant, such as assembly of modules, can be outsourced to a supplier to increase flexibility 
required for BTO (Sako et al., 1999b). A considerable barrier to the successful achievement of 
this are the institutional norms which develop in firms in order to build legitimacy (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991). One type of institutional norm that has a particular influence over manufacturing 
firms is the presence of strong unionization - established to protect the interests of the workforce.  
OEM trade union representatives may not agree that efficiency benefits will be gained from 
outsourcing production operations and that the interests of the work force will be downgraded, 
hence the union is likely to resist such a move. Such resistance to outsourcing operations has been 
well documented, for example at the General Motors Lansing assembly plant over the 
outsourcing of module assembly (Marinin & Davis, 2002). Lean strategies are neither wholly 
supported nor resisted by unions, and questions still arise over the effect of these institutional 
norms (Shah & Ward, 2003). 
JIT Capability 
Just-in-time (JIT) refers to the movement of material to the right place at the right time. Elements 
essential to its success concern the capability of suppliers to participate through information 
technology thereby enabling frequent communication (Wafa, Yasin, & Swinehart, 1996). JIT 
supply into vehicle manufacturers is expected to increase in the future with more suppliers having 
to cope with its associated demands (Von Corswant et al., 2002). Schonberger and Gilbert (1983) 
propose that the success of JIT practised by firms implementing lean principles is associated with 
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geographically proximate suppliers. However, research has also shown that this is not always the 
case (Wafa et al., 1996). Specifically, information and communication technologies are able to 
mitigate the effects of distance on successful JIT defined as reductions in inventory, component 
rejects, and delivery lead time. Thus, if JIT capability is necessary for BTO in the automotive 
sector, the co-location of suppliers may be less critical. Yet it has also been shown that 
geographical proximity of suppliers affects the trade-off between product variety and operational 
performance when mitigated by modularity (Salvador et al., 2002). These differing views 
question the assumption for close proximity in JIT strategies as an enabler for BTO. 
An alternative perspective argues that proximity provides additional benefits to JIT capability 
such as the development of knowledge-sharing (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Work relating to industry 
clusters indicates that the sharing of knowledge within these industrial groupings provides for the 
development of specific capabilities (Saxenian, 1994). It follows therefore that the capability for 
JIT could be enhanced by close proximity of supplier to supplier, and supplier to OEM, whereby 
tacit knowledge is transferred between firms within the industrial cluster, or in this case the 
supplier park.  
Supply chain disturbance 
There are many causes of supply chain disturbance that in turn affect the reliability of delivery. 
One of the causes of supply chain disturbance is where distant suppliers are more likely to 
experience disruptions in delivery, for instance problems experienced as a result of the transport 
infrastructure or from extreme weather conditions (Svensson, 2000). This has been described as 
one of the primary factors affecting the adoption of supplier parks (Cullen, 2002). Yet 
disturbances are not only limited to transport problems and can include events at supplier 
production sites such as strikes and machine breakdowns (Svensson, 2000). It is unclear from 
existing research whether bringing suppliers close to their customer manufacturing sites does 
indeed reduce these types of disturbances overall. 
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To understand the role of supplier parks in BTO strategy we develop a conceptual framework to 
structure our inquiry, based on the drivers, factors, and outcomes. Figure 1 shows that the 
‘outcome’ of developing supplier parks for BTO can be thought of as dependent upon drivers and 
moderated by factors. We argue that the drivers centre on the primary requirements of build-to-
order i.e. product mix and volume flexibility, with the addition of funding incentives that affect 
the decision to set up a supplier park. Factors moderate the relationship between drivers and 
outcomes. This approach uses contingency theory that is based on the alignment of endogenous 
and exogenous variables (Kast et al., 1981). Figure 1 provides the focus of our enquiry headed by 
the question - how can supplier parks be considered an imperative of build to order? Using our 
framework as an exploratory tool this can be divided thus:  
             ‘What relationship of drivers and factors produce particular outcomes?’ 
‘Can supplier parks be classified according to their support for build-to-order?’ 
Take in Figure One 
3 Method 
This study adopts an exploratory case study (Marshall & Rossman, 1989; Yin, 1994) to 
investigate whether supplier parks are an imperative to build-to-order in the automotive industry. 
While there are already several studies that describe the effects of BTO in the automotive sector 
(Gunasekaran, 2005; Holweg et al., 2004), this research aims to explore how the phenomenon 
interacts with the supply chain using supplier parks as the unit of analysis. It adopts a multiple 
case approach which uses the rationale of theoretical replication, not statistical sampling logic, 
where each case is selected so that it ‘either predicts similar results, or produces contrasting 
results for predictable reasons’ Yin (1994, p46 ibid). While ideally all 23 supplier parks in 
Europe would be investigated, limited resources and our exploratory approach meant 8 supplier 
parks were chosen as representing one or more factors from the conceptual framework (see 
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Appendix B for the case selection criteria) i.e. drivers and general characteristics of the customer 
(volume or premium manufacturers), that affect support for BTO (Table 1).  
Take in Table 1 
The study divides the cases into supplier parks which enable BTO, those with potential, and those 
which do not. It concludes with a matrix showing the relative position of all 8 cases in terms of 
their capability to provide support for BTO. The number of cases adopted here is consistent with 
good practice in case research where ‘the ability to conduct six to ten case studies’ is analogous to 
conducting a similar number of experiments on related topics. 
Case research is considered one of the powerful research methods in management studies, 
particularly in the development of new theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Voss et al., 2002). Yet practical 
problems can occur when attempting to systematically combine theoretical framework, empirical 
fieldwork and case analysis (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). This study adopts a conceptual framework 
based on the synthesis and interpretation of existing literature (see Figure 1). As the framework is 
developmental and broad, we argue the approach here is positioned as ‘exploratory’ where the 
aim is to develop more precise hypotheses on the relations between the different variables. 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Checkland (1991) underline the importance of the prior development of a 
framework to guide data collection and analysis. This provides a means of coping with the ‘flux 
of events and ideas in a real situation’ and requires the explicit declaration of an intellectual 
framework of ideas and research themes (Checkland 1991, p.400). While the framework may 
require rethinking as the researcher tries to make sense of the accumulating experience, it forms a 
secure point of reference during and after the field study, and as an instrument with which to 
compare with the literature. 
The idea to investigate supplier parks emerged from an earlier research programme, ‘3Daycar’, 
which studied the implications of introducing customer order fulfilment in the United Kingdom. 
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3Daycar shows that on average 40 days are needed in the UK to build and deliver a new vehicle, 
from order entry at the dealership to final customer delivery. Yet only one day is actually spent 
building the vehicle (Holweg et al., 2001). During a visit to the DaimlerChrysler Smart factory in 
May 2000, the response by personnel on the site suggested the proximity of suppliers in relation 
to vehicle manufacture is a significant factor that may improve BTO capability. This visit piloted 
the research and stimulated the development of the conceptual framework. Construct validity was 
addressed by discussing draft interview and case reports with research participants and adjusting 
these on the basis of their comments (Yin 1994). A case protocol (Appendix B) strengthened 
reliability during case selection, interview questioning and general procedure during site visits 
and interviews. 30 semi-structured interviews were conducted over an 18 month period involving 
17 site visits across Europe. Draft interviews and case reports were discussed with research 
participants and adjusted on the basis of their comments. The method of data analysis ensured 
internal validity through the process of codifying responses from each case and presenting them 
in tabular form for cross-case comparison and pattern-matching  (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The 
use of replication logic as part of the research design reinforced external validity, where patterns 
began to emerge across the cases as similarities and differences in the drivers, factors and 
outcome of supplier park support for BTO. Finally, the research was disseminated by presenting 
the results at academic conferences as well as industry seminars organized by the Society of 
Motor Manufacturers & Traders (SMMT) and the International Motor Vehicle Programme 
(IMVP) (Miemczyk, Howard, & Graves, 2004).   
  
4. Findings 
This section briefly describes the findings from the eight sites across Europe. The findings are 
summarised in Table 2 by the number of suppliers located on the supplier park, number of vehicle 
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models it serves, the distance in kilometres from the OEM assembly plant, annual OEM 
production volume, supplier park age, and country of location.   
Take in Table 2  
 
4.1 Supplier park case descriptions 
Seat, Abrera 
The supplier park at Abrera, near Barcelona in Spain, is located 2.5 kilometres from the Seat 
assembly plant. The park was established in 1992 when the main Seat assembly plant was moved 
from the suburbs of Barcelona to an industrial district 50 kilometres away. This move coincided 
with the development of a supplier park. The site was financed by an investment company that 
rents the site to the users of the park (the suppliers and logistics providers). The area of the site 
was increased by 30% in 1998 to cope with an expansion in capacity at the vehicle assembly 
plant. The site now operates with 32 suppliers carrying out a number of operations including 
inventory management, consolidation, late-configuration and assembly tasks, with all components 
being delivered in sequence to the plant by a third party logistics provider. The transportation is 
by truck with a 10 minute journey time. Around 946 journeys are made per day delivering 63 
component sets to three vehicle assembly lines. 
Ford, Bridgend 
The site at Bridgend, Wales was chosen specifically because it only assembles engines for Ford 
Motor Company and, more recent members of the Premier Automotive Group (PAG) such as 
Volvo and Land Rover. Many other Ford sites have associated supplier parks e.g. Valencia Spain, 
Cologne Germany, and Bridgend plant managers view this as an important part of their own 
strategy to cope with increasing pressures from Ford and other PAG customers. The site faces 
many of the issues that traditional vehicle assembly plant supplier parks face such as increasing 
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volumes and variety, the opportunity for government funding, as well as critical supplier issues 
affecting competitiveness such as the need for global sourcing. While construction of the park 
infrastructure has been completed and the plant is currently receiving deliveries from one 
supplier, Bridgend is still negotiating with other suppliers involved with JIT delivery to ascertain 
mutually beneficial conditions for their re-location.    
GM, Ellesmere Port 
The Ellesmere Port supplier park is another recent introduction following a re-organisation of the 
sequencing operation in 2001. The Ellesmere Port plant assembles two models, the Astra and 
Vectra for Vauxhall (UK) and Opel (Europe) brands. The introduction of a new model led to a 
reclassification of this facility to ‘flex-plant’ in order to cope with demand variability in the 
European market, hence the re-organisation of inbound logistics and supply. Originally two 
suppliers were located close to the plant, followed by the introduction of a new consolidation and 
sequencing centre. The park includes a whole range of activities from light assembly and late 
configuration, to sequencing and warehousing. There are now four suppliers onsite, including a 
third party logistics provider (3PL). One supplier and the 3PL handle the sequencing for the other 
suppliers as well as sequencing inbound deliveries from suppliers located across the UK and 
Europe. 
Volvo, Gent 
Established in 1999 the supplier park supporting the Gent assembly plant supplies components 
and modules in sequence to Volvo assembly plant. The suppliers are dispersed over an area 
between 1.5 and 3km from the plant. The OEM plant assembles 2 different models with an annual 
target volume of 160,000 cars. There are fifteen suppliers at the park supplying modules ranging 
from headliners, seats, tailgates and bumpers. The site was developed by a property services 
company with 10% of the investment costs met by Volvo and suppliers. Trucks are used to 
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transport the goods to the assembly plant with around 175 deliveries per day. The supply of goods 
is organised by Volvo and line-side inventory is also financed by the OEM. 
Jaguar, Halewood 
The development of the supplier park at Halewood coincided with the ending of Ford Escort 
production and the beginning of Jaguar X-Type production in 1999. The site is not dedicated to 
automotive suppliers, as a pharmaceutical firm also occupies the facility. The transition to Jaguar 
production led to a major reduction in capacity needed at the plant, leading to a re-organisation of 
the production layout and a reduction in the labour force. The park itself employs 850 personnel 
through the automotive suppliers. The area is designated ‘objective one’ which means that it 
qualified for European structural funding. This was used to pay for much of the development of 
the supplier park. 
Audi, Ingolstadt 
The Audi supplier park at Ingolstadt is an established site with eleven suppliers on site and a 
range of activities being carried out at the site. The site was developed to cope with an increase in 
both vehicle production volume and product variants, with Audi/VW adopting a module and 
platform strategy to decrease overall costs and increase flexibility. The site is 100% funded by the 
local government who lease it to suppliers and Audi. The site also houses general consolidation 
activities from a range of automotive suppliers. Ingolstadt is limited in its capacity for final 
assembly of vehicles hence some painted bodies are shipped to other locations in Germany and 
Hungary for this final stage of production. The supplier park is intended to assist this operation in 
addition to sequencing parts for final assembly on site.  
MG Rover, Longbridge 
The development of this supplier park was initiated by the re-structuring of manufacturing at 
Longbridge. When BMW relinquished control of Rover Group Birmingham in 2001, its new 
 19 
flagship model the ‘Rover 75’ had to be relocated from its Oxford production site, to Longbridge. 
The previous production location already had a number of co-located suppliers assisting with in-
sequence delivery, thus the intention was to replicate this at the new site. Longbridge was also 
undergoing change and spare capacity led to the availability of space for suppliers within the 
assembly site itself. However, only three suppliers followed the Rover 75 to its new location. 
These firms supply the ‘75’ assembly line, with three other vehicle models being served by more 
distant suppliers. The original production ethos of the 75 was to build to order, hence the use of a 
supplier park and sequencing centre was central to this strategy. 
Volvo, Torslanda 
Established in 1999, the supplier park at Arendal in Sweden supplies components and modules in 
sequence to the Torslanda Volvo assembly plant 3km away. The OEM plant assembles 4 
different models with an annual target volume of 170,000 cars. There are 15 suppliers at the park 
supplying modules ranging from headliners, seats, tailgates and bumpers. The site was developed 
by a property services company with 10% of the investment costs met by Volvo and suppliers. 
Trucks are used to transport the goods to the assembly plant with around 192 deliveries per day. 
The supply of goods is organised by Volvo with line-side inventory also financed by the OEM. 
The sequencing system is run by the suppliers on the park and provides signals every minute for a 
four hour delivery horizon. 
 
5.  Analysis and discussion 
The data from the cases require codification or a common classification to enable cross-case 
comparison. The conceptual framework guides the classification of case data into drivers, factors 
and outcomes. Drivers are classified in terms of the need for product mix flexibility, the need for 
volume flexibility, and the availability of public funding. Factors are variables that moderate the 
 20 
relationship between drivers and outcomes. The combination of factors and their specific 
attributes vary case by case. The attributes of start-up costs are high or low (where high relates to 
significant new developments in infrastructure and low represents re-use of existing facilities and 
significant external funding)
*
. The attributes of asset specificity are primarily high or low, but 
include site, plant, and personnel-related assets, and the risk of strategic inflexibility (again high 
and low referring to the two extremes of specific modules such as cockpits or unspecific products 
e.g. nuts and bolts). Two elements of institutional norms are encountered here and focus on union 
resistance and mimetic behaviour that follows perceived industry best practice. The attributes of 
JIT capability centre on who holds the requisite skills and competencies to co-ordinate sequenced 
in-line supply. Supply chain disturbance is perceived as either present or absent in terms of the 
impact on component supply. This research finds cases of transportation disturbance and attempts 
to mitigate this through late configuration. Some additional factors are also presented in Table 3 
that fall outside of the original classification e.g. change in corporate strategy.  
Take in Table 3   
The outcomes from the research emerge in the form of different supplier park types in terms of 
scale, proximity, and capability to enable supply chain flexibility e.g. ‘large-scale distant’, ‘small 
scale onsite’ (Table 3). The cross-case analysis reveals that there are differences in the 
characteristics of supplier parks in this study. From a physical perspective the supplier parks vary 
in size and location in relation to the vehicle assembly plant they serve. The parks also appear to 
differ with respect to how they enable build-to-order, and how the moderating factors affect the 
drivers for the development of supplier parks. The analysis now examines supplier parks that 
enable BTO, supplier parks with the potential to enable BTO, and supplier parks that do neither.  
 
                                                     
*
 Using high/low measure was necessary due to the lack of available objective measures to distinguish between the factors. 
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5.1 Supplier Parks that enable BTO 
The Volvo, Audi and Seat supplier parks are all large in scale with a significant amount of 
supplied value routed through the parks (80% in the case of Volvo). They are also distant from 
the assembly plant providing for some capacity flexibility if expansion is required, except in one 
case, Audi, which has limits to capacity variation due to union resistance. Each park had low start 
up costs as a result of external funding. Asset specificity is viewed as high, but in the case of 
Volvo, obligational contractual relationships allows the risk of opportunism and strategic 
inflexibility to be reduced supporting Dyer’s (1996) statement that the gains of specialization can 
outweigh the costs. The drivers for these parks come from the need to provide volume and mix 
flexibility in the supply chain, to reflect flexibility in the assembly plant, of which Volvo are 
particularly known for their build-to-order strategy. Capability in JIT operations in these cases is 
held by the OEM (with a strong control and coordination role). Yet this is not the case at Seat, 
where much of the capability is held by the third party logistics provider. 
Overall, these parks enable BTO at the assembly plant because of the need for volume and mix 
flexibility. There is the additional benefit of low start up costs, and the potential for strategic 
inflexibility is moderated by favourable supplier relations. This results in large-scale supplier 
park operations with high levels of outsourced in-sequence component supply.     
5.2 Supplier parks with the potential to enable BTO 
Supplier parks with the potential to enable BTO include MG Rover Longbridge and GM 
Ellesmere Port. These are small-scale adjacent or onsite parks of insufficient size to provide 
significant support build-to-order strategy. Moreover, the reasoning for their introduction is 
driven by either the need to use spare capacity (in the case of MG Rover) or the need to provide 
spare capacity for a sister facility in continental Europe (in the case of GM). The start up costs 
were not financed by an external body, which in turn affects the economics of locating suppliers 
 22 
close to the plant. However, other moderating factors also provide reasons why these sites might 
provide the potential for supporting BTO. The capability to provide in-sequence supply is being 
developed at both sites, thus supporting a process to provide product mix flexibility, especially as 
late configuration is introduced at both sites. Furthermore, the reduction of supply chain 
disturbance as a result of unreliable transportation provides conditions that are supportive of 
build-to-order. 
The principles behind these small-scale cases in theory support BTO at the vehicle assembly 
plants. However, despite their potential they are inhibited by the lack of scale of the operations, in 
one case this was the result of falling vehicle sales, and in the other due to sharing production 
with a sister site. 
5.3 Supplier parks that do not enable BTO  
The evidence from the last two cases, Ford and Jaguar, suggests these supplier parks do not 
enable BTO and have limited potential to do so in the future. In both cases the strongest driver 
appears to be the availability of external funding for the required supplier park infrastructure. For 
Jaguar, the original intention to build a supplier park was to provide volume flexibility, but a 
change in manufacturing strategy at European level has removed this requirement. Yet the park 
was established, suppliers co-located, and in-sequence supply initiated. The long call-off lead 
times of 12 hours removes the urgency of in-sequence supply, as this period of notice does not 
require close supplier location. In the case of Ford, while park infrastructure has materialised, 
only one supplier has located to Bridgend and a viable business case has still to be made to other 
partners. Evidence shows that this site demonstrated mimetic behaviour in that other Ford plants 
had already implemented supplier parks and reported performance improvements. While the plant 
was driven by a need for product mix flexibility (the number of engine variants produced had 
rapidly increased), the benefits of co-located suppliers to improve JIT capability and BTO were 
unclear. The types of suppliers would also produce high opportunism and strategic inflexibility 
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issues especially where primary manufacturing such as forging, casting, or machining were 
needed, as significant investment in supplier plant and personnel would be required. 
Hence, for these last two cases the drivers for BTO were largely absent. In the case of Jaguar the 
supplier park was not implemented to provide build-to-order advantages, and space on the park 
was utilised by non-automotive companies removing potential volume flexibility advantage. The 
Ford engine supplier park has only part materialised, despite external funding. The decision 
process for Ford may need re-aligning towards the benefits for build-to-order and an examination 
of whether engines could and should be produced just-in-time. 
5.4 Supplier parks: an imperative for build to order?  
Three supplier park types have emerged from the cross-case analysis supported by Table 3. First 
are supplier parks that enable BTO because they are large-scale, catering for volume and product 
mix flexibility. Start-up costs are often minimised through public and private funding. Second are 
supplier parks that in theory support BTO, but are small-scale, where drivers for either volume or 
product mix are lacking. Third are also small or underdeveloped supplier parks that do not 
support BTO because of overall weak drivers for flexibility and recent changes in manufacturing 
strategy. This paper identifies a pattern between supplier park types, proximity, strategic BTO 
flexibility, and scale. These relationships are plotted in Figure 2.   
Take in Figure 2 
Figure 2 shows a relationship between supplier park proximity and type. The analysis 
demonstrates that large-scale parks that enable BTO are associated with being ‘distant’ (more 
than 1km) from the OEM assembly plant. Supplier parks that are geographically distant offer 
greater opportunity for expansion than onsite or adjacent parks, and hence are more flexible. 
These parks are driven by both volume and product mix flexibility, and combine several 
moderating factors which enable BTO. This is shown in Figure 2 as strategic BTO flexibility. The 
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parks which do not enable BTO or only possess potential to do so are adjacent or onsite and are 
limited by the constraints of surrounding OEM infrastructure. According to this research adjacent 
and onsite parks are driven - at most - by either volume or product mix. Several moderating 
factors also need be considered in cases where the capability for BTO was less evident. For 
instance, changes in corporate strategy, union resistance to changes in working practice, and the 
difficulties of persuading suppliers to invest in an appropriate level of asset specificity.     
Returning to the research question, this paper indicates that only certain types of supplier parks 
are an imperative for build-to-order, described here as distant from the OEM assembly plant, 
providing strategic BTO flexibility, and possessing sufficient scale. The combination of factors 
and drivers that lead to this type are volume flexibility, product mix flexibility, low start-up costs, 
and managed asset specificity.    
 
6. Conclusions 
This study finds there are a number of different types of supplier park, yet only some of these 
have the characteristics to enable BTO. These are large-scale sites, 1 kilometre or more distant 
from the OEM assembly plant, and providing both volume and product mix flexibility. The 
supplier parks that do not enable BTO are small-scale, and provide volume and product mix 
flexibility only to a limited degree. These parks are characterised as onsite or adjacent to the 
OEM assembly plant. 
In terms of research limitations, this is a European study where concepts such as the availability 
of public funding may be idiosyncratic to this region.  While 8 cases out of a European total of 23 
is a good representation, a wider study across the total population including the US, South 
America, and Japan might include additional variables. Case study methods are appropriate for 
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explanatory research, yet further theory testing could be enhanced through cluster analysis 
techniques covering supplier parks world-wide. 
It is important to note that change is the ‘normal’ state for the automotive industry and this could 
have ramifications on the factors that influence decisions on future supplier park development.  
The increasing trend in modularisation and supplier alliances (e.g. Hella, Behr, and Plastic 
Omnium developing complete front-end modules) suggests an increased position of power for 
first tier suppliers. Their desire for scale effects could further restrict co-location opportunities. 
This could also lessen the effect of specific technologies (assets), as more components of modules 
are shared over more end products. A further interesting development is the desire for some 
vehicle manufacturers to remove nearly all short term variability in their supplier schedules 
(through better schedule reliability). This development could potentially reverse the trend in co-
locating suppliers altogether, where suppliers no longer need to respond to short term variability 
in material volume and mix requirements. 
This study has significant implications for theory. Contrary to received wisdom that supplier 
parks have developed because of the disruption caused by extended supply chains (i.e. Korean 
fuel pumps shipped to the UK) we find they are adopted for a variety of reasons. This includes 
the availability of public funding, corporate re-structuring, and the result of changes in strategy in 
addition to the more apparent need for volume and product mix flexibility. Supplier parks become 
an imperative for build-to-order in cases of increasing demand to deliver high product variety, the 
ability to cope with fluctuation in volume, and the capability to respond in short order lead times.  
This research supports Dyer’s (1996) view that competitive advantage in the form of build-to-
order is contingent on type of activity and degree of interdependence between OEMs and 
suppliers to achieve flexibility. A surprise finding is that supplier parks in close proximity to the 
OEM do not necessarily foster closer working relationships and knowledge sharing for BTO. 
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Hence, more distant supplier parks are better placed to enable build-to-order than onsite or 
adjacent parks. This questions the ‘closer is better’ hypothesis of Saxenian (1994). 
Returning to the conceptual model raises the issue of how well the model reflected the divergence 
in supplier park approaches. The model’s use of drivers appears to adequately predict supplier 
park development although the mix of each set of drivers is variable across each case. 
Furthermore, those parks which appear to support build-to-order do so as a result of a 
combination of factors related to improving JIT capability, reducing supply chain disturbances 
and require integration due to the level of specific assets (e.g. supplier’s products and processes 
that can not easily be switched to other OEMs). The start up costs and institutional norms appear 
to moderate whether supplier parks can actually be implemented, for example where costs are 
supported by an external agency and unionisation does not limit managerial choices on activities 
that take place in supplier parks. Company strategic direction, should also be included as a further 
moderating factor (either positive or negative) in the model to account for issues that emerged 
from the cases. Hence, factors can be categorised into ‘barriers to implementation’ and ‘enablers 
to build to order’. Further work should test these categories of factors across different cultural 
contexts to assess generalisability. Build-to-order remains an under-defined construct, and while 
it was not the focus of this work to develop this, continued research should focus on defining 
build-to-order and its role in sustaining competitive advantage. More generally, research should 
attempt to empirically link the benefits of proximity (in terms of information and knowledge 
sharing, reduction in supply disturbance etc) with the overall performance of the supply chain as 
well as the performance of individual firms in that chain. While there are clear potential benefits 
for OEMs, suppliers inevitably suffer by losing economies of scale, hence studying the effects at 
all levels of the supply chain is key. Furthermore, the effect of information systems may moderate 
the positive impact of supplier parks, supporting the work of Wafa et al., (1996) de-linking the 
need for proximity in JIT systems. 
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An important learning outcome for practitioners highlights the issue of where supplier parks have 
not fulfilled their promise to support build-to-order.  Managers at these supplier parks need to 
focus on: 1) whether there is demand for flexibility in the first place, 2) the site is not simply a 
convenient use of spare capacity, and 3) where there is genuine demand for build-to-order, is 
there adequate support from top management? Supplier parks with the potential for BTO need to 
build scale by encouraging suppliers to locate with appropriate levels of asset specificity managed 
through trust-based, obligational supplier relationships (Sako, 1990). Only by considering the 
supplier park in the context of a long-term vision and as part of a dedicated strategy towards 
building to order can VMs and suppliers expect to realise superior levels of performance.            
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Appendix A - Case study suppliers and products supplied 
 
Case Suppliers Product/s supplied 
Benteler,  Axles 
Cristaleria Glass 
Expert Brake sub-assembly, Sub-frame, driveshaft, ECU, 
fuel pump 
Johnson controls Front end, steering column 
kautex textron Fuel tanks 
lignotock Panels 
Monroe Shock absorber 
SiemensVDO Cockpit 
TRW Unicables, Yazaki 
Sylea Wiring 
Seat, Abrera 
Ace, Antolin Irausa, Arvin, 
Borgers, Bosal, Delphi, 
Emisint, Galvaplast, Inducar, 
Magneti Marelli, Mai, 
Pertersa, Perti, Sivesa 
Various others including exhausts 
Ford, Bridgend In early development phase Logistics services and basic components (‘nuts and 
bolts’) 
Delphi Cruise control, generators, steering wheels, audio 
systems, a/c modules, compressors, wiring systems, 
suspension modules, power brakes, front subframe 
Plastic Omnium Bumpers, fog lights 
Inergy Fuel tanks, filler systems 
Ellesmere Port 
Mackie/Ryder Logistics and assembly, interior trim, cooling 
modules 
Faurecia Dashboards / Cockpit 
Rieter Floor mats / carpets 
ECA Seats 
MCS Wheels and tires 
Lear Interior parts 
JCI Head lining and tunnel console 
Plastal Bumpers 
Tennaco Exhaust systems 
Autoliv Steering Wheel  and airbags 
Delphi Cable Harness 
Inoplast Tailgates 
Borgens Hat-shelf 
Sekurit Windows 
TI Group Fuel tanks 
CLG Wheel suspension system 
Volvo, Gent 
ECT Powerpack, 
FX Coughlin Logistics services 
Conix Front and rear bumper 
Visteon Instrument panel assembly, cooling modules, centre 
console 
Stadco Body construction subassemblies 
JCI Interior and trim components 
Lear Seats, harnesses (wiring looms) 
Jaguar, Halewood 
Infast Fasteners, hardware 
Dräxlmaier Wiring harness/dashboard 
Delphi Interior wiring harness 
Faurecia Front end 
Seeber, Interior door linings 
SiemensVDO Fuel tank assembly 
Kautex Fuel tank assembly 
Audi, Ingolstadt 
Montes Air Filter/Centre Consoles 
 31 
Illbruck Door Insulation 
Rehau Bumper module 
Peguform Door lining/bumper module 
VW Braunschweig Suspension module 
Johnson Controls Instrument panels/fascia 
Plastic Omnium Front and rear bumpers 
MG Rover, 
Longbridge 
Sommer Allibert Headliners  
JCI Head lining/tunnel console  
Lear Seats, 
Plastal Bumpers 
Tennaco Exhaust systems 
Faurecia Cockpit 
Autoliv Steering wheels and airbags 
CLG Wheel suspension system 
ECT Powerpack 
MCS Wheels 
TI Group Fuel tanks 
Sekurit Windows 
Rieter Carpets 
Delphi Cable Harness 
Scheren & Trien Roof mouldings 
Inoplast Tailgates 
Volvo, Torslanda 
Borgens  Hatshelf 
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Appendix B - Case Study Protocol 
 
 
1.0 Case selection criteria 
Age: recent and more established parks i.e between 0 and 10 years 
Size: large (10 suppliers or over) and small (less than 10 suppliers) parks  
OEM activity: volume vehicle assembly, premium vehicle assembly and engine manufacture 
Drivers for the Supplier park development: Mix or volume flexibility requirements, funding 
incentives 
 
2.0 Interview schedule 
 
General information: When was plant opened? When was last model change? How many models 
produced? What is annual production target? What are body styles and variants? Describe other 
production variables. 
 
Information on suppliers on park: location, date of development, components produced, union 
membership, nature of infrastructure, cost of development and source of funding, area of site, 
responsibilities, training, information and knowledge sharing. 
 
Operations and logistics: mode of transport, frequency of delivery, delivery performance, level of 
inventory, roles and responsibilities. 
 
Information flow: types of information systems, frequency and time horizons, information 
variability and reliability. 
 
What are the factors that influence decision to locate a supplier on the park? Follow conceptual 
model items. 
What are the benefits of supplier parks?  
 
3.0 Site visit procedure 
• Tour of supplier park and facilities. 
• Tour of vehicle assembly plant and specifically inbound logistics operations to line-side. 
• Interviews with supplier park managers and materials, planning and logistics managers. 
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OutcomeFactor Driver 
Start-up 
Costs
Funding 
incentives 
Supplier park’s  
support for          
build-to-orderInstitutional 
norms
Supplier 
asset 
specificity
Product mix 
flexibility 
Volume 
flexibility 
JIT 
Capability
Supply 
chain 
disturbance
 
Figure 1 Conceptual framework: drivers, moderating factors, and outcome 
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Figure 2 The role of supplier parks for build-to-order  
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Case Organization / location Drivers Other characteristics No. 
visits 
No. 
interviews 
Initial 
visit 
1 Seat / Exel Logistics, Abrera, Spain Government 
funding 
Volume manufacturer 2 5 24/4/02 
2 Ford Motor Co Ltd, Bridgend, UK Product mix Volume manufacturer 3 3 14 /2/02 
3 General Motors, Ellesmere Port, UK Product mix Volume manufacturer 4 6 20/3/01 
4 Volvo Car Corp, Gent, Belgium  Prod/Vol flex. 
Gov’t funding 
Premium manufacturer 1 2 15/5/02 
5 Jaguar Cars Ltd, Halewood, UK Gov’t funding Premium manufacturer 1 2 26/5/02 
6 Audi AG, Ingolstadt, Germany Gov’t funding Premium manufacturer 1 2 21/2/02 
7 MG Rover Group, Longbridge, UK Volume flex. Volume manufacturer 3 6 14/3/01 
8 Volvo Car Corp, Torslanda, Sweden Prod./Vol. flex. Premium manufacturer 2 4 21/3/02 
Table 1 Rationale for the selection of supplier parks visited during this research 
 
 
 
 Seat 
Abrera 
Ford 
Bridgend 
GM 
Ellesmere 
Volvo 
Gent 
Jaguar 
Halewood 
Audi 
Ingolstadt 
MG Rover 
Longbridge 
Volvo 
Torslanda 
Number of 
suppliers 
32 1 4 15 6 11 3 15 
Number of 
models 
6 3 2 2 1 2 4 4 
Distance to 
OEM (kms) 
2.5 0.5 1 3 0.5 0.5 0 3 
Volume (pa) 426,675 1,075,000 350,000 160,000 55,610 308,594 163,144 170,000 
Age (yrs) 10 1 3 3 4 6 2 4 
Country Spain UK UK Belgium UK Germany UK Sweden 
 
Table 2 Supplier park case statistics 
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Case Drivers Factors Outcome 
Volvo 
Torslanda 
• Product mix flexibility 
• Volume flexibility 
• Low start up costs 
• Risk of strategic 
inflexibility 
• 80% of supplied value 
delivered by SILS 
• A large-scale distant 
supplier park critical to 
sustain BTO 
• Inflexibility ameliorated by 
obligational contractual 
relationships 
Volvo      
Gent 
• Product mix flexibility 
• Volume flexibility 
• Low start up costs 
• Risk of strategic 
inflexibility 
• 80% of supplied value 
delivered by SILS 
• A large-scale distant 
supplier park critical to 
sustain BTO 
• Inflexibility ameliorated by 
obligational contractual 
relationships 
Seat      
Abrera 
• Product mix flexibility 
• Volume flexibility 
• Low start up costs 
• Low asset specificity 
• Union resistance 
• JIT capability held by 
third party provider 
• Distance allows capacity 
flexibility 
• A large-scale distant third 
party controlled supplier 
park 
• Separate location from the 
OEM assembly plant means 
capacity can be expanded 
Audi 
Ingolstadt 
• Public funding 
• Product mix flexibility 
• Volume flexibility  
• Low start up costs 
• Personnel and plant asset 
specificity 
• Union resistance 
• JIT capability held by 
OEM 
• A large scale adjacent 
supplier park  that addresses 
the recent increase in 
component variants and 
volume  
• Core role in both reducing 
logistics costs and 
overcoming capacity 
constraints 
Jaguar 
Halewood 
• Public funding 
• Volume flexibility –  
(reduced during development) 
• Low start up costs 
• Union resistance to 
• JIT capability held by 
OEM, but long call-off 
leadtime 
• A large scale, mixed use 
industry park, the result of a 
change in manufacturing 
strategy by Ford Europe  
• No drivers for BTO, hence 
no benefits 
MG Rover 
Longbridge 
• Product mix flexibility  
• Volume flexibility –  
(reduced during development) 
• Low start up costs 
• Low site, personnel, and 
plant asset specificity 
• Perceived need to 
maintain JIT capability 
• Disturbance perceived as 
risk (transportation) 
• A small-scale, on-site 
dedicated supplier park 
capable of supporting BTO  
• Insufficient number of 
suppliers to enable BTO 
• Reduction in overall 
production volume means 
BTO is low priority 
GM  
Ellesmere 
Port 
• Volume flexibility  
 
• Supplier develops the JIT 
capability 
• Risk of strategic 
inflexibility 
• Disturbance perceived as 
risk (mitigated through 
late configuration) 
• A small-scale, adjacent 
supplier park capable of 
limited support by 
minimising the effects of 
SC disturbance through late 
configuration 
Ford  
Bridgend 
• Public funding 
• Product mix flexibility 
• Low start up costs 
• High asset specificity for 
suppliers (primary 
manufacturing) 
• Replicating industry best 
practice on SP 
• JIT capability held by 
OEM 
• Disturbance perceived as 
risk (transportation) 
• A small-scale shared 
industry park with one 
supplier and one logistics 
provider (low level specific 
assets to Ford) despite the 
prospect for supporting 
BTO 
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Table 3 Cross-case analysis of the drivers and factors affecting supplier park outcome 
